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ABSTRACT 
After the events of 9/11, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-3 (HSPD-3) 
established the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) to provide a comprehensive 
and effective means to disseminate information regarding the risk of terrorist acts to 
federal, state, and local authorities and the American people. Under HSAS, threat levels 
were raised or lowered 16 times, but never below Threat Level Yellow (Elevated 
Condition). HSAS should have been straightforward and easy to understand. What 
evolved was confusion over alerts, lack of specific threat information, concerns over 
costs to institute and maintain protective measures, and questions regarding what was 
expected of citizens. Government agencies, the private sector, and the general population 
became immune with the threat level remaining at or above Yellow.  
HSAS was woefully misunderstood not just by the general population, but also 
within federal, state, and local governments. Ridiculed by comedians, HSAS gradually 
began to disappear, to the point where it was necessary to search to find the current threat 
level, whereas it had once been prominently posted. The purpose of this thesis is to 
review HSAS and the associated problems, look at comparable international systems, and 
present an alternative recommendation to provide timely and informative warnings of 
terrorist threats, and restore credibility by merging HSAS with the already existing DoD 
Force Protection Conditions.  
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In April 2011, the United States moved from a color-coded Homeland Security 
Advisory System (HSAS), which had been in place for nine years, to a new National 
Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS), which has yet to issue its first alert. This thesis 
examines how a homeland security alert system should function to keep citizens aware of 
threats to the public and why the system was changed. It also discusses and recommends 
a proposal to merge or replace the current system with the Department of Defense Force 
Protection Conditions (DoD FPCON). 
On March 12, 2002, six months after the attacks on the Pentagon and World 
Trade Center, President Bush signed Homeland Security Presidential Directive-3 (HSPD-
3) and created HSAS. Governor Tom Ridge then introduced the system and described 
how it worked. In his remarks, Governor Ridge elaborated that the system had the 
following features. 
• Designed to measure and evaluate terrorist threats  
• Communicate threats to the public in a timely manner 
• Flexible to apply to threats made against a city, a state, a sector, or an 
industry 
• Provides a common vocabulary 
• Provides clear, easy to understand factors that help measure threat 
• Empowers government and citizens to take actions to address the threat 
HSAS had five levels, with recommended protective measures, to represent an 
increasing level of terrorist threat. While binding on the executive branch, HSAS was 
voluntary to other levels of government and the private sector. Assigned threat conditions 
were reviewed at regular intervals to determine whether adjustments were warranted 
(Bush, 2002). 
Despite these assurances, in the nine years HSAS existed, the country remained at 
Threat Level Yellow (Elevated Condition) or higher with the last change in alert levels 
 2 
having occurred in August 2006. The two lowest levels were never used (Homeland 
Security, 2008a). Confusion occurred over what state and local governments were 
required to do when a change was directed. Private citizens received misleading 
information that led to an increasing tendency to dismiss the advisory system. 
On July 14, 2009, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet 
Napolitano established the Homeland Security Advisory System Task Force to conduct a 
60-day review of HSAS. Its mission was to assess the effectiveness of the system in 
informing the public and communicating protective measures concerning terrorist threats 
and report back to the Secretary with its findings (Homeland Security, 2009a). 
When the task force completed its review, Secretary Napolitano announced on 
January 27, 2011 that over the next 90 days, HSAS would be replaced in favor of NTAS. 
Secretary Napolitano expressed that NTAS would more effectively communicate 
information about terrorist threats by providing timely, detailed information to the public. 
The color-coded system would be replaced by alerts clearly stating that an “imminent or 
elevated threat” existed along with a concise summary of the threat, information about 
actions being taken to ensure public safety, and recommended steps individuals, 
communities, businesses, and governments could take (Homeland Security, 2011e). On 
April 20, 2011, Secretary Napolitano announced implementation of NTAS, a robust 
terrorism advisory system replacing the color-coded system (Homeland Security, 2011d). 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION  
HSAS should have been a straightforward and easy to understand system to alert 
government agencies, the private sector, and civilians to increased threats of terrorist 
activity. However, what evolved was confusion over alerts, a lack of specific information 
being shared as to the nature of the threats, concern over the additional costs to institute 
and maintain protective measures over a long period, and questions from citizens 
regarding what was expected of them. HSAS was widely criticized at multiple levels and 
had definite flaws that required repair to restore confidence and credibility to provide 
timely and informative warnings of terrorist threats. The question is how, could, or  
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should HSAS be revised to provide federal, state, and local governments, private 
organizations, and ordinary citizens with timely and informative warnings of terrorist 
threats?  
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
This thesis reviews HSAS, associated international systems, and the identified 
flaws that have now led to the introduction of NTAS. Much of the debate about HSAS 
pertained to the lack of information forthcoming from the government about the nature of 
terrorist threats and where they may strike. The economic and psychological factors of 
maintaining high levels of sustained alert over a long period of time were also concerns 
along with the lack of specific measures to take when a threat level was changed. This 
thesis also explores an alternative system already in place within the Department of 
Defense (DoD). The Department of Defense Force Protection Conditions (DoD FPCON) 
would provide a quick and easy method to restore credibility and make notification of 
terrorist threats a viable and easily understood system. Additionally, since NTAS has 
been in place for over 18 months, an initial assessment can be made as to how effective it 
has been in replacing HSAS. However, as no NTAS alerts have been issued during this 
time, no metrics are available to measure its effectiveness. The federal government, state 
and local governments, private industry and the American public are the consumers of 
this research. 
D. ARGUMENT 
Under HSAS, the author would arrive at his office on Fort Sam Houston, after 
passing through an entry gate and showing his identification card to a security guard, and 
enter the world of FPCON Alpha, which is defined as an increased general threat of 
possible terrorist activity against personnel or facilities, the nature, and extent of which 
are unpredictable (Air Force Manual 10-100, 2004, p. 19). Since DoD installations were 
exempt from following HSAS, he could now, in theory, relax his vigilance as he was no 
longer “in” San Antonio, and therefore, subject to Threat Level Yellow (Elevated 
Condition), which is defined as a significant risk of terrorist attacks (Bush, 2002). By 
definition, in just passing through a gate and showing his identification, the author 
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transitioned from a significant risk of terrorist attack down to an increased general threat. 
Upon departing Fort Sam Houston and the protection of FPCON Alpha, he would reenter 
the elevated threat area within San Antonio and make the drive to the San Antonio airport 
where upon entering the terminal, he would be greeted with the following recorded 
announcement: “The Department of Homeland Security has changed the threat level to 
Orange.” No mention was made that this change was designated only for the aviation 
sector or that it had remained at that level since it was raised in August 2006 (Chertoff, 
2006). With Threat Level Orange being defined as a high risk of terrorist attack, in the 
space of five miles and less than 15 minutes, the author had traveled from a general threat 
(FPCON Alpha) through a significant risk (Threat Level Yellow) to a high risk (Threat 
Level Orange) of a terrorist attack (Bush, 2002). Psychologically, this continuous change 
to unknown threats was more extreme than having been stationed in Riyadh, Saudi 
Arabia during Desert Storm under the threat of Scud attacks. The Scuds were real, the 
threat levels were constant, and thus, it was possible to adapt his living situation 
accordingly. However, in this situation, what choices were available: live and react to the 
high-risk threats, ignore the high risk and take a more middle of the road response with 
the significant risk, or ignore the risk completely? Without specific threat information 
with which to assess the situation, the choice was either be controlled by the threat of a 
terror attack or maintain a relatively normal lifestyle, take the appropriate precautions, 
and rely on law enforcement and intelligence agencies to provide the necessary 
information at the appropriate time.  
The introduction of NTAS promised to provide better and timelier information, 
and therefore, should have removed any confusion while making the risk decision 
process simpler. However, the author still finds himself going from a higher to a lower 
risk when entering Fort Sam Houston. Also, the disappearance of Threat Level Orange 
signs and audio alerts is primarily the only difference seen at airports.  
HSPD-3 opened with the statement that the nation requires a HSAS to provide a 
comprehensive and effective means to disseminate information regarding the risk of 
terrorist acts to federal, state, and local authorities and to the American people. Such a 
system would provide warnings in the form of a set of graduated “threat conditions” that 
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would increase as the risk of the threat increases (Bush, 2002). HSAS did provide citizens 
with information to provide security and protection from terrorist attack, but was itself 
under attack due to the timeliness or lasting effects of vague warnings that provided little 
information on the true nature of the threats. No major terrorist attacks occurred 
following implementation of HSAS, but that did not mean HSAS provided the best 
response. In reality, the long periods of time before lowering the threat levels or not 
providing the public with complete explanations worked in the terrorist’s favor as it 
increased both the financial burden on cities and kept citizens in constant fear of 
additional attacks. 
This argument began with a comparison of HSAS and FPCON systems with a 
specific purpose in mind. It is the author’s hypothesis that HSAS and FPCON had the 
same goal, essentially the same terminology, were based on the same intelligence, and 
could have been merged or linked to create an alternative advisory system that would 
have been easier to understand and implement. Advantages of introducing FPCON as an 
alternative system would include a consistent level of threat, specific response measures, 
warnings issued on a regional or local basis depending on the threat, and a system with 
which a large portion of the federal government and general population was already 
familiar.  
The introduction of NTAS has not changed the argument. The very fact that 
NTAS has not issued any alerts over its initial 20 plus months while reports of law 
enforcement thwarting terrorist attacks are received, intelligence agencies are providing 
information of potential attacks, and/or minor attacks are being executed, creates concern 
about the new system.  
E. METHOD 
An analysis of the documented flaws with HSAS and a sample case study is the 
method used to validate this thesis. Having indicated the areas in which the system is 
currently broken and with the knowledge that the system required revision if it was to 
remain a credible and useful tool, a recommendation is then proposed and a description 
provided of how to eliminate current flaws. The recommendation describes how a merger 
 6 
of HSAS with FPCON would provide one credible and recognizable viable system. 
NTAS is also reviewed as the replacement for HSAS to ascertain if in fact it has 
measured up to its stated goals. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
With establishment of HSAS (Bush, 2002), the United States entered a new era in 
fighting terrorism. As opposed to the Cold War era of nuclear weapons with air raid 
shelters accompanied by duck and cover drills, HSAS was designed to provide the nation 
with an easy means to disseminate information to federal, state, and local authorities and 
the American people (Bush, 2002). For nine years, the system in place was 
misunderstood, ridiculed, ignored, and it was not completely clear what level was in 
effect, what the threat was, or what the general public should have been doing. Starting 
with a general background of HSAS as established by White House and Homeland 
Security documents, this research then turned to terrorist advisory systems used by other 
countries to determine if aspects could be incorporated into HSAS. The author expanded 
his search for outside sources and researchers with views on HSAS and its effectiveness. 
Next, he did a search of state homeland security websites and concluded the initial review 
by evaluating DoD FPCON.  
A. HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM 
Governor Tom Ridge introduced HSAS on March 12, 2002 and elaborated on the 
following features (White House, 2002a). 
• Designed to measure and evaluate terrorist threats 
• Communicate threats to the public in a timely manner 
• Flexible to apply to threats made against a city, a state, a sector, or an 
industry 
• Provides a common vocabulary 
• Provides clear, easy to understand factors that help measure threat 
• Empowers government and citizens to take actions to address the threat 
Governor Ridge continued to describe the five color-coded levels that were at the 
core of the advisory system, by stating, “The nation currently stands in the yellow 
condition, in elevated risk….we will not be able to lower the condition to green until, as 
the President said yesterday, the terror networks of global reach have been defeated and 
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dismantled” (White House, 2002a). Associated with each level were recommended 
protective measures to be taken; however, the measures were very generic and the actual 
development of appropriate measures was left to each federal agency (Bush, 2002). A 
key point is that HSAS was only binding on the executive branch and suggested to other 
levels of government and the public/private sector (Bush, 2002). When initially designed, 
the advisory system did not provide any measures for states, local communities, industry, 
or private citizens. How this situation was remedied to some degree is discussed in a 
following section. The five levels contained within the advisory system were the 
following (Bush, 2002): 
• Low Condition (Green). This condition is declared when there is a low 
risk of terrorist attacks. Refining and exercising as appropriate preplanned 
protective measures;  
• Ensuring personnel receive proper training on the Homeland Security 
Advisory System and specific preplanned department or agency 
Protective Measures; and  
• Institutionalizing a process to assure that all facilities and regulated 
sectors are regularly assessed for vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks, 
and all reasonable measures are taken to mitigate these 
vulnerabilities. 
• Guarded Condition (Blue). This condition is declared when there is a 
general risk of terrorist attacks.  
• Checking communications with designated emergency response or 
command locations;  
• Reviewing and updating emergency response procedures; and  
• Providing the public with any information that would strengthen its 
ability to act appropriately.  
• Elevated Condition (Yellow). An elevated condition is declared when 
there is a significant risk of terrorist attacks.  
• Increasing surveillance of critical locations;  
• Coordinating emergency plans as appropriate with nearby 
jurisdictions;  
• Assessing whether the precise characteristics of the threat require the 
further refinement of preplanned Protective Measures; and  
• Implementing, as appropriate, contingency and emergency response 
plans.  
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• High Condition (Orange). A high condition is declared when there is a 
high risk of terrorist attacks.  
• Coordinating necessary security efforts with Federal, State, and local 
law enforcement agencies or any National Guard or other appropriate 
armed forces organizations;  
• Taking additional precautions at public events and possibly 
considering alternative venues or even cancellation;  
• Preparing to execute contingency procedures, such as moving to an 
alternate site or dispersing their workforce; and  
• Restricting threatened facility access to essential personnel only.  
• Severe Condition (Red). A severe condition reflects a severe risk of 
terrorist attacks. Under most circumstances, the protective measures for a 
severe condition are not intended to be sustained for substantial periods of 
time.  
• Increasing or redirecting personnel to address critical emergency 
needs;  
• Assigning emergency response personnel and pre-positioning and 
mobilizing specially trained teams or resources;  
• Monitoring, redirecting, or constraining transportation systems; and 
• Closing public and government facilities.  
 
Figure 1.  Homeland Security Advisory System (From: Homeland Security, 2008b) 
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The decision to raise or lower the threat level was initially given to the Attorney 
General and was based on gathered intelligence and the associated risk. Factors used for 
analyzing threat assessments before recommending a change to the alert level included 
the following (Bush, 2002). 
• To what degree is the threat information credible? 
• To what degree is the threat information corroborated? 
• To what degree is the threat specific and/or imminent? 
• How grave are the potential consequences of the threat?  
Authority to assign threat conditions was transferred from the Attorney General to the 
Secretary of Homeland Security on February 28, 2003 with the signing of Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive-5 (Bush, 2003). The Secretary consulted with the 
Homeland Security Council prior to raising or lowering the threat (Reese, 2003). 
The remainder of the White House and Homeland Security documents revolve 
around the raising and lowering of the threat level over the years and the rationale or 
intelligence behind making the decision. Since its inception, the threat level was raised or 
lowered 16 times (Homeland Security, 2008a) beginning with the first anniversary of the 
9/11 attacks on September 10, 2002 (White House, 2002b). The latest was the 
announcement that the aviation sector was being lowered from red to orange for inbound 
flights from the United Kingdom (UK) on August 13, 2006 (Homeland Security Press 
Release, 2006). 
B. INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY SYSTEMS 
The next set of literature reviewed concerned international terrorist alert or 
advisory systems. The primary reason for evaluating systems in other countries is that 
their struggle against terrorism has been going on for much longer. As a result, these 
systems have been in place for some time. An interesting observation is that despite the 
worldwide nature of the terrorist threat, only a limited number of countries have actually 
established a threat advisory system. Surprisingly, no two European anti-terror alert 
systems are the same despite the proximity and open borders. Each country decides when 
and how to activate a given alert level within its territory. The Home Secretaries of the 
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United Kingdom and Spain did meet in an attempt to create an alert system for the entire 
European Union; however, a solution has yet to be reached (Sordo, 2006). Despite not 
developing a common alert system, European Union members have established a 
common definition of terrorism along with common penalties for terrorist crimes 
(Archick, Ek, Gallis, Miko, & Woehrel, 2006, p. 13). 
1. France 
The French system, Vigipirate, was designed in 1978 and consists of two levels, 
“simple” and “reinforced” above normal, which was changed to a four-level color-coded 
system in 2003 to make the system more flexible and understandable (Intellnet, 2003). 
Threats are assessed based on national and international circumstances and proposed 
changes to the alert level are presented to the President and to the Prime Minister, who 
have the authority to trigger “Plan Vigipirate.” The appropriate authorities including 
national and local government agencies then implement the relevant monitoring, 
prevention and protection measures (Absolute Astronomy, 2008). 
A defining feature of Vigipirate is the specificity of response measures 
corresponding to the various threat levels, which is tied to specific sectors. Also notable 
is the openly public release of measures to be taken in the event of plan activation. Public 
engagement and confidence in the system is likely to be much higher under a system that 
releases, rather than shields, threat level information. Vigipirate relies on joint 
participation and advances the principle of shared responsibility from individual citizens 









Levels of alert for “Plan Vigipirate” 
Yellow level—to stress vigilance 
Raise security levels to face real yet still uncertain dangers, through measures that 
are local and minimally disruptive of normal activity, while preparing to switch to 
“orange” or “red” within a few days. 
Orange level—to warn of terrorist action 
Take measures against plausible risks of terrorist action, including the use of 
means that are moderately disruptive to normal public activities, while preparing 
to switch to “red” or “crimson” on short notice where possible. 
Red level—to warn of serious attempts 
Take measures against a proven risk of one or more terrorist actions, including 
measures to protect public institutions and putting in place appropriate means for 
rescue and response, authorizing a significant level of disruption to social and 
economic activity. 
Crimson level—to warn of major attempts 
Notification of a risk of major attacks, simultaneous or otherwise, using non-
conventional means and causing major devastation; preparing appropriate means 
of rescue and response, measures that are highly disruptive to public life are 
authorized. 
Figure 2.  Vigipirate (From: “Vigipirate,” 2008) 
2. United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom had a threat system in place for years; however, details and 
warnings were kept from public scrutiny until 2006 following the London subway 
bombings. The British system consists of five threat levels, is now color-coded, and is 
based on the assessment of a range of factors including current intelligence, recent 
events, and what is known about terrorist intentions and capabilities. This information 
may well be incomplete and decisions about the appropriate security response are made 
with this in mind. The British system also includes three response levels, which provide 
an indication of the security measures that should be applied (Security Service Security 
Service MI5, 2008). 
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Threat level Response 
Critical 





Maximum protective security measures 
to meet specific threats and to 
minimize vulnerability and risk 
Severe an attack is highly likely 
HEIGHTENED 
 
Additional and sustainable protective 
security measures reflecting the broad 
nature the threat combined with 
specific business and geographical 
vulnerabilities and judgments on 
acceptable risk Substantial 









Routine protective security measures 
appropriate to the business concerned 
Low an attack is unlikely 
Figure 3.  UK Threat Advisory System (From: UK Intelligence Community Online, 
2008) 
3. Netherlands 
The Netherlands have a unique system that in reality is two separate systems that 
work together as one to provide terror alerts. The National Coordinator regulates the 
entire system for Counterterrorism (NCTb) and the Minister of Justice announces any 
changes. The task of the NCTb is to minimize the risk of terrorist attacks in the 
Netherlands and take prior measures to limit the potential impact of terrorist acts. The 
NCTb is responsible for the central coordination of counterterrorism efforts and ensures 
that cooperation between the parties involved is and remains of a high standard (National 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb), 2008). 
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The Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands (DTN) determines the general 
threat level for the Netherlands and Dutch interests abroad based on a wide range of 
intelligence (National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb), 2008). DTN consists of 
four levels: minimal, limited, substantial, and critical and are regarded as a threat range 
(National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (National Coordinator for Counterterrorism 
(NCTb), 2008). DTN does not deal with specific locations or times but with the question 
of how great is the risk that a terrorist attack will be carried out against the Netherlands? 
Since the assessment is so general, no security measures are taken based on DTN alone. 
It therefore primarily has an impact on the government’s anti-terrorist policies (National 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb), 2008). 
Developed to look more specifically at the threat level within certain key areas or 
economic sectors, the Counterterrorism Alert System is not color-coded and is a special 
alert system for the government and the corporate sector. The alert system warns 
government services and businesses in the event of an increased level of threat so that 
they can quickly take security measures and distinguishes between four levels of threat 
(National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb), 2008). The NCTb supplies threat-
related intelligence for the purposes of the system (National Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism (NCTb), 2008). 
Intended for major economic sectors and local authorities with a focus on the 
country’s critical infrastructure, the factors determining whether a sector becomes part of 
the system depends on the extent to which the sector is of vital financial and economic 
importance, whether the sector forms an attractive target for terrorist attacks, has the 
potential for terrorists to cause numerous casualties by unsophisticated means, or whether 
targets have a great symbolic value for Western society. The counterterrorism alert 
system currently covers 14 sectors: airports, railways, seaports, tunnels and flood 
defenses, chemical industry, oil industry, drinking water, electricity, natural gas, nuclear, 
municipal and regional transport, finance, public events, and hotels (National Coordinator 
for Counterterrorism (NCTb), 2008). 
The Counterterrorism Alert System was not designed to communicate with the 
general public; however, if it becomes necessary to raise the threat level, the public will 
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be notified about the threat and the reasons behind raising the alert level. In the event of a 
terrorist threat, the system offers a standard ‘catalogue’ of measures per threat level and 
sector, the possibility of tailoring measures to the threat, the assurance that coordinated 
action is being taken by both private sector and the government, and nationwide 
coordination of security measures in both the technical and administrative sense. The 
system consists of four levels (National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb), 2008). 
• Standard—Prudent precautions, normal operational management 
• Low—Staff alerted, heightened degree of internal supervision, police 
surveillance 
• Moderate—Security checks at points of entry, heightened police 
surveillance, certain processes stopped or re-routed 
• High—Access to the facility blocked, evacuation, services discontinued, 
security checks by heavily armed personnel 
The Counterterrorism Alert System considers threat information if the threat in 
question clearly relates to a participating sector. DTN, however, considers all threats 
pertaining to the Netherlands, which explains, for example, how DTN can indicate the 
general threat level is ‘substantial’ while the threat level for the participating sectors is 
basic because a threat to a specific sector does not necessary imply that the threat to the 
Netherlands as a whole has increased to the same degree. 
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 Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands (DTN) Counterterrorism Alert System 
For whom? Politicians, policymakers, government bodies 
Government and the sectors 
involved 
Objective 
To provide a general description of the 
potential threat to the Netherlands: what 
is the probability that a terrorist attack 
will take place in the Netherlands within 
a specific period? Informs the public 
about the general threat level. 
To provide a description of the 
terrorist threat to a particular vital 
business sector. Intended to make 
it possible to take sector-specific 




• Minimal  
• Limited  
• Substantial  
• Critical  
• Standard 
• Low threat  
• Moderate threat  





The Netherlands as a whole (non-place-
specific) Participating sectors. 
Measures The DTN is too general to serve as a direct basis for security measures. 
A package of measures (tailored to 
the threat level) is taken by both 
the sector in question and 
government. 
Figure 4.  DTN and Counterterrorism Alert System Comparison (From: National 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb), 2008) 
4. Australia 
The Australian Government has a National Counter Terrorism Plan (NCTP) 
(National Counter-Terrorism Committee, 2005) that outlines the measures the country 
will take when intelligence indicates a potential threat. The current plan includes 
amendments to the alert system that took effect on October 1, 2008 (National Counter-
Terrorism Committee, 2005). Changes to the threat level are issued at the discretion of 
the Prime Minister, Australian Government Attorney-General or other Australian 
Government Minister upon advice of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (NCTC), based 
on assessments of the threat environment by the National Threat Assessment Centre 
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(NTAC). The alert level informs national preparation and planning, dictates levels of 
precaution and vigilance to minimize the risk, and is used as the basis of public 
discussion of the risk to Australia. Each state and territory government determines its 
response to a terrorist incident based on an assessment of the risk (National Counter-
Terrorism Committee, 2008). 
As with all the systems, Australia relies upon strong intelligence to target 
prevention and preparedness measures based on risk management principles (National 
Counter-Terrorism Committee, Ch 3, para 13, 2005). NTAC issues threat assessments on 
which the various jurisdictions and agencies make risk management decisions on how 
best to respond to lower the risk (National Counter-Terrorism Committee, Ch 3, para 19, 
2005). The Australian Counter-Terrorism Alert System is tiered and can be applied 
nationally, by jurisdiction, sector, or geographic location, and consists of four non-color-
coded levels (National Counter-Terrorism Committee, Ch 3, para 20, 2005). 
• Low—terrorist attack is not expected 
• Medium—terrorist attack could occur 
• High—terrorist attack is likely 
• Extreme—terrorist attack is imminent or has occurred 
Due to the tiered nature, security measures may vary across different jurisdictions 
or sectors (National Counter-Terrorism Committee, Ch 3, para 24, 2005). 
5. Russia 
Russia is the latest country to consider adopting a color-coded system and is 
planning to introduce one patterned after HSAS. Although discussed in the State Anti-
Terror Committee for the last five years, it has yet to be introduced to the legislature 
(Bessonov, 2008). 
6. Norway 
While not having a nationwide threat advisory system, Norway’s Police Security 
Service conducts and grades threat assessments into three levels: low, medium, or high. 
These assessments are then issued to the government agencies responsible for preventing 
and responding to threats. No protocol is in place to communicate directly with local 
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governments, the private sector, or the general public. Government agencies and county 
governors can be directed to take action; however, local governments, private sector, and 
the general public cannot be instructed to take actions unless warranted by law (General 
Accounting Office, 2004b, p. 47). 
7. Germany 
Germany also does not have a nationwide system of threat levels or requirements 
for specific actions to be taken. However, Germany does have a central communication 
center that processes information for forwarding to government agencies on actions to 
take during natural disasters and other threats. The communication center is responsible 
only for information management while the government agencies are responsible for 
deciding what measures to take. Threat information is communicated to the general 
public, individual institutions, and the business community by law enforcement agencies, 
state government, or federal government according to the nature of the threat (General 
Accounting Office, 2004b, pp. 47–48). 
C. STATE HOMELAND SECURITY  
In reviewing state homeland security websites with information posted, all had a 
common theme that ventured more towards natural disaster than terrorism and few 
actually referred to HSAS. Not all states had information posted as to how to respond, 
and more importantly, each state took an individual approach to the guidance published 
for the public. The majority of the states have taken an all hazard approach and combined 
natural disasters with terrorist attacks into common preparedness and response plans, for 
which HSAS was not designed. 
As mentioned, the states varied in their approach and a sampling was selected for 
this review primarily based on the states the author was most familiar with as part of his 
work in coordinating terrorist related exercises. States outside this region were also 
reviewed to provide a contrast, particularly after seeing the trend of little if any guidance 
being published as to what the different threat levels meant and how the public should 
respond.  
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Pennsylvania has a very straightforward and simple approach and basically copies 
the Homeland Security site describing HSAS without providing additional information to 
the public (Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Office of Homeland Security, 2002). South 
Dakota, on the other hand, does not mention HSAS on its homeland security website 
other than the current national level, but with no mention of the aviation sector. The 
South Dakota site describes the mission of homeland security and offers information and 
links to other sites, but does not prescribe any specific guidelines for implementing 
changes to HSAS (South Dakota Office of Homeland Security, 2008). 
Wyoming has even less information and refers the public to www.ready.gov 
while outlining some basic steps to take during any type of emergency. Reference to 
HSAS is not made on the site including the current threat level (Wyoming Office of 
Homeland Security, 2008). Utah is very similar in that it is focused more on natural 
disasters than a terrorist threat and again no reference to the current threat level is made 
(Utah Department of Public Safety, 2008). Nebraska also does not display or reference 
HSAS, but does provide links to the DHS and Red Cross sites to obtain information 
(Nebraska Emergency Management Agency, 2008). 
The North Dakota Division of Homeland Security works with North Dakota 
communities with a common goal of protecting citizens, critical infrastructures, and the 
assets they control. In the wake of 9/11, each North Dakota community adopted 
heightened security measures with private, public, and individual partnerships 
emphasizing the necessity to report any suspicious activities in neighborhoods, schools, 
workplaces, high-profile, heavily-attended events, and key facilities. North Dakota has 
evaluated and adjusted training and operational initiatives, incorporated aviation security 
measures, heightened security of key facilities, increased intelligence gathering and 
sharing among law enforcement, military, and public agencies, enhanced direct 
communications with federal counterparts, and launched public information campaigns 
designed to empower individuals and organizations at the local level. Along with these 
activities, the North Dakota Terrorism Protective Measures Resource Guides provide an 
overview of terrorist threats facing key assets within the state and measures to protect 
them. The guides are intended to give information and assist in determining areas within 
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these critical facilities vulnerable to possible terrorist attacks and ways in which to 
protect them. Despite all the measures taken by North Dakota, HSAS or current threat 
levels are not mentioned or displayed (North Dakota Department of Emergency Services, 
2008). 
The Colorado Division of Emergency Management (CDEM) also has no direct 
guidance for HSAS, nor is the current threat level displayed on the site; however, it does 
discuss terrorism. The focus of its homeland security page is to downplay the terrorist 
threat by emphasizing that it is natural to be afraid of terrorists and their acts, and that it 
is also this fear upon which terrorists feed to achieve their political and social goals. It 
continues by highlighting that terrorism causes fear because it is difficult to predict when 
or where a terrorist may strike. After listing factors known about terrorists, CDEM 
stresses it is committed to planning for, training, and exercising emergency first 
responders and support agencies at the state and local level to reduce the risks of 
terrorism. However, preparedness is everyone’s job and then lists some basic actions 
individuals can take for any type of disaster or emergency (Colorado Division of 
Emergency Management, 2008). 
Iowa’s Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEMD) website 
displays the current threat levels, but refers people to the DHS site for additional 
information. HSEMD’s underlying priority is ensuring Iowa is prepared and ready to 
respond to any emergency or disaster. The site discusses how Iowa is more secure and 
better prepared to prevent, respond to, and recover from emergencies and disasters, 
natural or human-made as a result of a partnership between citizens, volunteer and faith-
based organizations, the private sector, and state, local and federal governments. Iowa’s 
homeland security responsibilities date back to the State Civil Defense Agency in 1965. 
Following 9/11, they were integrated into the duties and responsibilities of the 
Emergency Management Division (EMD). The EMD assumed the responsibilities for 
developing and coordinating the implementation of a comprehensive state strategy to 
secure Iowa from terrorist threats or attacks and was renamed in 2003 to reflect the 
homeland security and emergency management missions. Since Iowa is more likely to  
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face floods, tornadoes, and hazardous materials spills than a terrorist attack, many of the 
steps taken to prepare for emergencies apply to both terrorism and other disasters (Iowa 
Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 2008). 
In contrast to the above-mentioned states, California takes a different approach, 
and after describing HSAS, lays out the specific measures to be taken under each threat 
level. The measures are additive and increase as the threat level rises with a total of 95 
measures that could be implemented. These measures are only recommended and not 
required to be implemented. Each department or agency within the state is responsible for 
determining which actions and plans are appropriate to implement for their organization 
(Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, 2003). 
Alaska is also pretty much in line with California in that the current levels are 
displayed and specific measures are listed for each threat level. These measures are 
currently in draft and are broken down by threat level and matrixed against critical 
facilities protective actions, state and local government actions, and anticipated public 
response. As with California, these measures are additive as the threat level increases 
(Alaska Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 2008). 
The Alaska Department of Military and Veteran Affairs webpage displayed the 
HSAS threat levels in comparison to the DoD FPCON levels. The site indicates that the 
two systems were not developed to be a mirror image of each other. Instead, the 
Homeland Security System was developed to be an advisory system and complements the 
DoD FPCON system. Figures 5 and 6 display a comparative view of the HSAS versus the 
FPCON with a description of each. This comparison shows how closely they are related 






Figure 5.  HSAS vs. FPCON Levels (Diagram) (From: Alaska Department of Military 








• Be aware of surroundings 
• Know how to turn off power, gas, & 
water 
• Know where HAZMAT is stored & 
proper disposal methods for unneeded 
chemicals 
• Know back-up systems (generators, 
flashlights, etc.) 
• Note routines & exceptions to routines 
FPCON NORMAL 
• Applies when there is no discernible 
terrorist activity 
• Under these conditions, only a routine 
security posture, designed to defeat the 
routine criminal threat, is warranted. 
• The minimum FPCON for U.S. Army 
commands is NORMAL. 
Blue—Guarded 
• Key leaders become familiar with 
emergency response & business 
resumption plans 
• Develop a communications plan for 
emergency response & key personnel. 
• Review, update & practice plans for 
higher levels 
• Review security for access control to sites 
FPCON ALPHA 
• Applies when there is a general threat of 
possible threat activity against personnel 
and/or installations 
• The nature and extent of which is 
unpredictable, and circumstances do not 
justify full implementation of FPCON 
BRAVO measures 
• Commands must be capable of 
maintaining FPCON ALPHA measures 
for extended periods, with only limited 
impact on normal operations 
Yellow—Elevated 
• Continue lower threat conditions 
procedures 
• Announce ELEVATED condition to 
employees 
• Notice & report non-routine / suspicious 
activities 
• Identify & monitor information-sharing 
sources 
• Update & test emergency response & key 
personnel contact lists 
• Coordinate emergency plans by 
jurisdiction 
• Review & practice employee security 
procedures 
FPCON BRAVO 
• Applies when an increased or more 
predictable threat exists 
• Commanders must be able to maintain  
measures for several weeks without 
substantially affecting operational 
capabilities, or aggravating relations with 
local authorities and members of the local 
civilian or host nation community. 
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Orange—High 
• Continue lower threat conditions 
procedures 
• Announce HIGH conditions to employees 
& explain anticipated actions 
• Monitor world & local events 
• Ensure security measures are all in place 
• Report all suspicious activities & objects 
• Search all personnel and items 
• Restrict “close-by” vehicle parking 
FPCON CHARLIE 
• Applies when an incident occurs or 
intelligence is received indicating 
imminent terrorist action 
• Implementation of FPCON CHARLIE 
measures for more than a short period will 
probably create hardships for personnel 
and affect the peacetime activities of units 
and personnel 
RED—Severe 
• Continue lower threat conditions 
procedures 
• Announce SEVERE condition to 
employees  
• Immediately report suspicious activity to 
law enforcement 
• Deploy security personnel based on threat 
• Restrict entry & parking access at critical 
sites 
• Maintain close contact with law 
enforcement 
• Provide security in parking lots & 
company areas 
• Restrict/suspend all deliveries to critical 
sites 
FPCON DELTA 
• Applies when a terrorist attack has 
occurred, or intelligence indicates likely 
terrorist action against a specific location 
• Normally declared as a localized warning 
and requires implementation of mandatory 
security measures 
• Commanders are authorized and 
encouraged to supplement these measures. 
• Implementation of FPCON DELTA 
cannot be sustained by commands for 
extended periods without causing 
significant hardships for personnel and 
affect the peacetime activities of units and 
personnel 
Figure 6.  HSAS vs FPCON Levels (From: Alaska Department of Military and Veteran 
Affairs, 2002) 
D. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
DoD installations are exempt from following HSAS as it operates under its own 
threat advisory system known as Force Protection Conditions (FPCON). This system has 
five levels: Normal, Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, and Delta, which represent increasing levels 
of terrorist threat. Along with each level are mandatory minimum protective measures 
implemented at each unit within an installation. The FPCON is based on a variety of 
information including threat and vulnerability assessments from various sources. 
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Individual installation commanders can also implement additional measures based on 
their local assessment providing flexibility within the system. The HSAS and FPCON 
systems are not tied to each other, but are based on the same intelligence (General 
Accounting Office, 2004b, pp. 42–43). 
DoD Instruction 2000.16 dated October 2, 2006 paragraph E3.22 is the guidance 
and standard for FPCON measures. This instruction gives geographic commanders anti-
terrorism authority and responsibility for all DoD personnel, including family members, 
to include establishing a baseline FPCON and to ensure that measures are uniformly 
disseminated and implemented. One of the key components of this instruction, paragraph 
E3.22.2.2, establishes a review mechanism to lower FPCON levels as soon as the threat 
environment permits. This mechanism is essential as remaining at elevated levels for an 
extended duration is counterproductive to effective security. Enclosure 4 from DoDI 
2000.16 specifically discusses FPCON measures and how they progressively increase 
protective measures in anticipation of or in response to a terrorist attack. The measures 
assist commanders in reducing the risk of terrorist attack to DoD personnel. Enclosure 4 
provides a definition for each of the five levels along with detailing measures for 
implementation at each level (Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 2000.16, 2006). 
Joint Publication 3-07.2 Appendix J further outlines the terminology and 
definitions of the FPCON measures to ease inter-service coordination and support 
antiterrorism activities. It states the purpose of the FPCON system is accessibility to and 
dissemination of appropriate information. The declaration, reduction, or cancellation of 
specific FPCON levels belong to the appropriate commander based on this intelligence 
(Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.2, 1998). As a geographic commander, the Commander of 
U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) determines the minimum force protection 
level for installations located within the continental United States and is responsible for 
defending the homeland and providing defense support of civil authorities. While 
USNORTHCOM establishes the minimum level, individual installations can raise the 
level based on their risk assessments. Currently, the majority of military installations are 
at Alpha, which indicates a general threat of possible terrorist activity (USNORTHCOM 
News, 2007). This level would equate closer to guarded (blue) on HSAS rather than 
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elevated (Yellow) that indicates a significant risk and at which this nation has been for 
over six years.  
FPCON levels as described in Air Force Manual 10-100 are progressive levels of 
terrorist threats and initiate pre-planned actions. FPCON declarations are normally 
provided through the chain-of-command, public address systems, or other available 
resources (Air Force Manual 10-100, 2004, p. 19). 
 
Condition Application Considerations 
FPCON 
NORMAL 
Applies when a general global threat of 
possible terrorist activity exists. 




Applies when there is an increased 
general threat of possible terrorist 
activity against personnel or facilities, 
the nature, and extent of which are 
unpredictable. 
 
ALPHA measures must be capable 




Applies when an increased or more 
predictable threat of terrorist activity 
exists. 
Sustaining BRAVO measures for a 
prolonged period may affect 
operational capability and relations 
with local authorities. 
FPCON 
CHARLIE 
Applies when an incident occurs or 
intelligence is received indicating some 
form of terrorist action or targeting 
against personnel or facilities is likely. 
 
Implementation of CHARLIE 
measures will create hardship and 






Applies in the immediate area where a 
terrorist attack has occurred or when 
intelligence has been received that 
terrorist action against a specific 
location or person is imminent. 
 
Normally, this FPCON is declared 
as a localized condition. FPCON 
DELTA measures are not intended 
to be sustained for substantial 
periods. 
 
Figure 7.  Force Protection Levels (From: Air Force Manual 10-100, 2004, p. 19) 
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III. HSAS CRITIQUES  
From its very inception, HSAS suffered from attacks on its credibility. Comedians 
began joking about the color-coded levels and various mock systems began popping up 
on the internet. Charges that HSAS was being used for political purposes began to 
surface and news outlets stopped running banners across TV screens with the current 
threat level. As years passed, the critiques became harsher as no credible information was 
provided to back up raising the threat levels and no closure was provided when they were 
subsequently lowered. While protective measures provided guidelines for law 
enforcement officials to follow, they did not provide instructions for the general public. 
According to a poll conducted by the Anser Institute for Homeland Security (data 
retrieved on April 19, 2002), 31 percent of the respondents said HSAS will be somewhat 
or very effective in informing the public of potential terrorist attacks, while 43 percent 
say it will be somewhat or very ineffective. HSAS was already drawing negative reviews 
only a month after the announcement (Center for Defense Information Terrorism Project, 
2002). 
A. SYSTEM CRITICS 
The advisory system was not without critics. Arguments have ensued that the 
administration has not fully defined the threshold for a change to the threat level. 
Ridge’s warning lights are meant to reflect the terrorist threat, but instead 
they are cause for confusion and a staple joke on late-night television, 
writer John Miller said in a June 2002 edition of The National Review. 
People don’t need a set of lights with vague significance; they need useful 
information and practical advice. (Online NewsHour, 2003) 
Following a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) warning to police about a 
possible “spectacular” al-Qaida attack planned against the United States and its interests, 
a warning that did not spark a threat level boost, The New York Times asked how 
Americans could be asked to prepare against a terrorist strike without more precise 
information: 
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The only thing warnings this vague are good for is providing political 
cover in case of disaster, the Times wrote in a Nov. 17 editorial. They 
offer no specific information about the location, timing or method of 
attack, and are all but useless  to the average citizen, or even to local law 
enforcement officers. (Online NewsHour, 2003) 
Other critics said it is more appropriate for specific warnings to come from local 
or state governments rather than the federal advisory system.  
Nobody knows what the color levels mean. That’s okay, they’re declaring 
a level  for the entire country. But the further down you drill, the more 
specific you need to become. Washington, D.C. Deputy Mayor for Public 
Safety Margret Nedelkoff Kellems told The Washington Post in 
November. (Online NewsHour, 2003) 
Despite the criticism and jokes about how the system was designed, Secretary 
Ridge stated state and local law enforcement officials are pleased with the system 
because it allows agencies to work from the same page. 
[The advisory system] was embraced by the 50-plus homeland security 
advisers because we all think we need a standard vocabulary that says to 
the country what level of risk we’re at, Ridge said in May. I think the 
system is working very well. (Online NewsHour, 2003) 
As established under HSPD-3, HSAS was designed for the federal government 
and left states, communities, and industry to establish their own responses (Bush, 2002). 
In response, non-governmental agencies, states, and industrial sectors have worked to fill 
this void. Although well intended, this approach has no standardization and still leaves 
the public uninformed without a strong informational process to disseminate the 
information.  
Across the country, questions of “what does a condition ‘yellow’ mean to me or 
my family?” or “What does this mean to a business or school?” remained. The American 
Red Cross recognized the need and developed a complementary set of guidelines for the 
following areas: individuals, families, neighborhoods, schools, and businesses. Each of 
these guidelines is based on HSAS, provides actions to be executed, and is available on 
the Red Cross website (American Red Cross, 2003). 
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One of the most extensive and critical articles on HSAS was written by Jacob 
Shapiro and Dara Cohen in 2007 entitled Color Blind: Lessons from the Failed Homeland 
Security Advisory System and published in the International Security Journal. They 
specifically ask if the system works, and if not, what are the central problems and how 
might they be mitigated or eliminated. Their primary argument is that the system is based 
on the confidence of those making the decisions, but that over time, HSAS came to be 
seen as politically manipulated, and ultimately, has failed. With no statutory authority to 
order specific measures from state and local governments or private industry, the system 
has to fall back on the confidence generated from the information and that the costs of 
protection are less than the expected losses. HSAS has not met that level and the result 
can be seen by the lack of response by state and local governments and confusion 
amongst the general public. In their view, the problems with the current system have not 
been addressed in any existing critiques, and ultimately, propose an alternative system 
that in their opinion solves the major flaws in the current system. Their alternative system 
would correct the main flaw in motivating protective actions by requiring the federal 
government to pre-negotiate a set of measures with industry and governments for each 
advisory level. They argue specificity about the threat would be ensured and the actions 
to reestablish trust and confidence in the system would be taken (Shapiro & Cohen, 2007, 
pp. 121–123). 
The first section of their article covers the origin and gradual failure of HSAS, 
which having already been discussed in this thesis, is not repeated in this section. After 
describing the origins, Shapiro and Cohen discuss the political manipulation of the 
system dating back to February 2003 just prior to the Iraq war. They document a 2003 
poll that indicated only 9 percent of individuals made any changes to their daily routines. 
They contend that decreasing trust along with a lack of federal funding have led to a 
steady decline in responsiveness. In response, DHS created regional alerts versus the 
broad national alerts and set internal guidelines that would raise the alert level based only 
on credible intelligence. Despite these adjustments, by the time of the 2004 presidential 
election, 40 percent of the population believed that increases in the alert level were 
politically motivated. This increasing distrust of the system led to state and local 
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governments dropping HSAS from their planning. The random nature of when levels 
were increased or lowered without specific threats sent a message that the system is 
arbitrary and not linked to actual threats. Per the authors, by the beginning of 2006, 
HSAS had failed as a system yet they emphasize it has served a valuable service in 
providing a common language between states and advances in public warnings issued by 
states (Shapiro & Cohen, 2007, pp. 123–132). 
In their discussion of other international alert systems, Shapiro and Cohen begin 
by stressing that most differ significantly from HSAS. Again, with a review of other 
systems already provided, a full review is not given in this section. The additional 
country they mention is Israel and how the government issues alerts to the military and 
law enforcement agencies, and on occasion, to the media for dissemination to the public. 
They highlight that Israel is more concerned with specificity to avoid overwhelming the 
populace with constant alerts (Shapiro & Cohen, 2007, pp. 132–135). 
Shapiro and Chen then discuss the logic of terror alerts with the ultimate goal of 
the government being to prevent an attack, deter, divert, or defer an attack, or to mitigate 
the consequences of an attack. They assert that public alert systems, if trusted, may create 
the incentives to generate deterrence, and ultimately, restore public confidence in the 
system. They also underscore that some insist HSAS exists only to protect government 
officials from blame and to keep terrorism as a political topic. The basic logic is 
presented as a formula using the probability of an attack and an alert being issued that can 
in reality be boiled down to a basic risk equation (Shapiro & Cohen, 2007, pp. 135–141). 
The authors argue that HSAS possesses three weaknesses: contradictions and 
tensions inherent in the system reduce its credibility, it is extremely sensitive to wrong 
assumptions about how agents will react due to no defined actions, and the complexity of 
the system can lead to unexpected secondary effects. Shapiro and Cohen underline that 
the first weakness is not inherent in alert systems but due to the construction of HSAS. 
The other two weaknesses can plague any alert system. They contend that combined 
these problems have significantly diminished the value of HSAS and contributed to its 
irrelevance. Contradictions exist in the system as it only applies to the federal 
government, yet state and local authorities are expected to respond, and while only 
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intended to trigger government actions, has been used as a public warning system. Even 
government agencies have reported uncertainty as to appropriate protective measures, 
which have resulted from a lack of specific pre-arranged actions to be taken not only at 
the federal level but also down to state and local levels, as well as industrial sectors. This 
uncertainty can lead to unexpected consequences when anticipated actions are not 
executed at lower levels or conflicting warnings or alert levels leave authorities unsure 
how to respond (Shapiro & Cohen, 2007, pp. 141–149). 
In their final section, Shapiro and Cohen propose an alternative structure. After 
offering their argument as to why legislation alone will not fix the system, they review 
the problems with the current system, diminished impact on subsequent alerts, 
contradictions and confusion reducing trust, wrong assumptions about actions being 
taken, and systemic complexity. They recommend a system that maximizes trust without 
revealing damaging information. The first step is to develop specific actions available at 
each alert level and formalize the process. They suggest a system in which an alert is 
generated at a specific level with additional measures for a specific region. Standards 
would have to be established for what type of intelligence it would take to trigger an 
increased alert. This alternative system possesses four advantages: reduces the need for 
negotiations during a crisis, reduces confusion by having pre-existing measures, reduces 
the number of wrong assumptions being made, and reduces the systemic complexity by 
removing incompatibilities in plans. In resolving the current weaknesses and restarting 
the process at the ground level, a system could be developed that would regain the trust 
of the public (Shapiro & Cohen, 2007, pp. 149–154). 
B. COMMUNITY AND STATE RESPONSE 
In a similar vein, Roger Kemp, city manager of Vallejo, California, authored an 
article for the October 2005 Public Management Journal entitled Homeland Security: 
Common-Sense Measures to Safeguard Your Community. In his article, Mr. Kemp 
provided a checklist of items that local officials should take so that citizens know they are 
being protected. Since the United States has never been below threat level yellow, his 
suggested measures are based on raising the threat level to orange. The checklist includes 
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recommended items for citizens and business personnel in addition to the city 
government. His recommendations include placing a community’s response measures 
into hard copy and distributing to appropriate personnel along with posting it on a 
community website for local citizens. His goal is to have the community prepared and 
using simple guidelines represents a common-sense approach (Kemp, 2005). 
In an article published in the September 2007 edition of the Journal of 
Contingencies and Crisis Management, Christopher Reddick examined homeland 
security preparedness and planning. He analyzed data from city managers and the key 
result indicated a high level of collaboration between city government and other levels of 
government. One important aspect of his study was that in their planning, city managers 
did not view HSAS as being extremely effective. Thirty-two percent of the city managers 
responding to the survey considered HSAS to be ineffective and it was also perceived 
negatively (Reddick, 2007, p. 163). 
Each time the alert status is raised, state and local communities spend resources to 
guard critical infrastructure, increase patrols, and staff emergency operation centers, 
which can place a significant strain on states and communities already facing budget cuts. 
In July 2003, The Council of State Governments conducted a teleconference to examine 
possible solutions to this issue and look at best practices (Homeland Security Brief, 
2003). 
Prior to 9/11, many state and local governments already had warning systems in 
place that either followed a numbering system or were similar to the DoD system. Most 
were established for government officials and agencies and required little communication 
or coordination with the private sector or the public. Another problem was the lack of 
standardization across jurisdictions. Following the attacks on 9/11, the need for a national 
system that could better communicate the threat across the full spectrum was realized, 
which is a standardized system with a basic vocabulary and framework for national 
preparedness (Homeland Security Brief, 2003). 
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With the implementation of HSPD-3, most states adopted HSAS that allowed 
conformity with other states and the federal government. However, the lack of well-
defined protective measures has led each state and business sector to develop their own, 
with a resulting lack of uniformity (Homeland Security Brief, 2003). 
The article reviews the expenses public agencies spend during increased alerts 
and mentions a survey by the U.S. Conference of Mayors taken in 2003 that it cost cities 
$70 more per week to be at orange rather than yellow due to overtime pay for initial 
responders, emergency operation centers, and the use of the National Guard. 
Representative John Milner of Illinois in particular notes two issues (Homeland Security 
Brief, 2003). 
First, the federal government issued blanket warnings and threats. In doing 
so, states have been faced with doing too little or too much and given the 
gravity of terrorism today, states are opting for the latter, and rightfully so. 
Secondly, states themselves are working through a long process of 
conducting vulnerability assessments and without a clear understanding of 
infrastructures and vulnerabilities, states are finding it difficult to develop 
sound strategies for each alert level. 
As a result, states are struggling to define protective measures for each advisory level. 
Without a quantifiable output or cost-savings to measure, officials are feeling political 
pressure to reduce spending on protective measures. In addition, a critical challenge for 
state governments is working with the private sector and meshing the states’ system with 
the industrial sectors advisory system (Homeland Security Brief, 2003). 
The states face additional challenges in combating complacency during alert level 
changes, addressing the lack of uniformity and coordination amongst states regarding 
protective measures, coordinating with cities and counties, and educating and 
communicating with the public. The federal government is also aware of these issues and 
determining areas that need improvement using national level exercises. One issue the 
article did highlight is whether a need exists for five levels and will it ever be possible to 




challenges, flexibility is built into the system to allow states and communities to 
determine their protective measures and the resources they want to commit (Homeland 
Security Brief, 2003). 
C. INDUSTRIAL SECTOR RESPONSE 
In a letter to Robert Mueller, then director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) President Michehl Gent (personal 
communication, April 26, 2002), provided the electricity sector comments on HSAS. The 
North American Electric Reliability Council’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Advisory 
Group (CIPAG) developed these comments. The electricity sector supported the 
development of HSAS and asserted that it could assist in responding to the current threat 
environment. In combination with HSAS, the electricity sector had developed a threat 
alert system out of necessity subsequent to September 11, 2001. The Threat Alert Levels 
and Physical Response Guidelines were published November 26, 2001 (North American 
Electric Reliability Council (NERC), 2002a). 
The NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Working Group (CIPWG) developed 
the electricity sector threat alert system, which was designed to meet unique requirements 
of the electricity systems of both the United States and Canada. The alerts can be applied 
on a geographic, organizational, specific site, or type of facility. Specific actions 
(guidelines) are recommended for each of four defined threat levels that were designed 
specifically for the electricity sector after a thorough evaluation of alternatives. CIPAG 
encouraged DHS to establish a similar well-defined four-level system. In addition, it 
encouraged DHS to include natural disasters in regional advisory levels (North American 
Electric Reliability Council (NERC), 2002a). 
The original version of the electricity sector alerts as published in 2001 listed five 
goals (North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC), 2002a). 
• Define threat alert levels 
• Provide guideline examples of security measures to be considered 
• Ensure the electricity alert levels are consistent with threat information 
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• Ensure threat information is included in the threat alerts 
• Issue the alerts for a specific region, city, or type of facility 
The threat levels in the initial version were established as normal, low, medium, 
and high. Each of the levels had associated response guidelines for the electrical sector to 
consider. The response measures were not all inclusive and additional measures could be 
added (North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC), 2002a). CIPAG updated the 
alert system on October 8, 2002 with Version 2. The goals remained the same; however, 
the alert definitions were revised to align with the HSAS five-tiered color-coded system 
(North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC), 2002b). 
Version 3 of the security guidelines was released on November 1, 2005. The first 
notable difference was that the goals were reduced to the following (North American 
Electric Reliability Council (NERC), 2005). 
• Provide examples of security measures to be considered 
• Achieve uniformity in response actions across the electricity sector 
However, the major changes in Version 3 were the addition of a process for 
communicating changes in the threat level alerts by combining the threat levels with the 
response measures, and increasing the number of measures to be considered (North 
American Electric Reliability Council (NERC), 2005). 
While federal agencies are required to implement specific measures to reduce 
vulnerabilities, state and local governments are only recommended to take similar 
actions. Meanwhile, the private business sector has been left on its own accord. As seen 
above, the electricity sector has established guidelines; however, over half of American 
businesses are not ready for security-related threats (Schmidt, 2004). A survey conducted 
by the American Management Association in 2003 indicated 64 percent of businesses 
have basic crisis management plans, 45 percent have specific plans, and only 42 percent 
conducted drills or tested their plans (Schmidt, 2004). 
A primary reason for this lack of preparedness is associated with the cost of 
increasing alert levels. However, unlike the government, businesses can actually reduce 
costs by implementing comprehensive plans. A key to preventing security threats is to 
customize HSAS to the individual business by performing a risk assessment to evaluate 
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vulnerability, potential consequences, and mitigation opportunities. Schmidt indicates 
that many trade associations have developed industry specific measures and crisis 
management planning, such as the NERC. He also includes charts that suggest protective 
measures to be considered with each of the threat levels. He concludes that the HSAS has 
not erased vulnerability, but has provided a framework from which businesses can 
prepare for terrorism (Schmidt, 2004). 
In that same regard, ASIS International has developed Threat Advisory System 
Response (TSAR) Guideline. The initial document was published in 2004 with a second 
edition released in 2008, and is applicable and designed for the private sector to assist in 
providing the appropriate level of security and reduce the risk of a terrorist event. The 
Guideline emphasizes that with 85 percent of the national infrastructure under the control 
of private business and industry, they will play a significant role in mitigating the effects 
and costs of an incident and that the public-private partnership is a crucial component of 
the national strategy for combating terrorism (Asis International, 2008). 
The Guideline provides private business and industry a tool for consideration of 
possible actions that can be implemented based upon the HSAS alert level. The Guideline 
is a baseline from which protective measures can be enacted and does not anticipate all 
incidents nor does it provide specific recommendations, but can be tailored by any 
organization to fit its needs. The first measure recommended by the Guideline is for users 
to conduct a risk assessment of their facilities, infrastructure, and personnel. Ideally, this 
assessment would be done at a low level of threat before the condition is elevated. The 
measures recommended are cumulative and build upon each other as the threat increases; 
therefore, measures already in place should remain in effect (Asis International, 2008). 
It is notable that ASIS has combined the green and blue levels into one 
combination and consider that many of the recommended measures at this level have 
already become routine. As a result, the Guideline is broken into four levels with 
measures recommended for emergency response–business continuity, personnel 
protection, and physical protection. The actual matrices are easy to read and use, and 
provide a baseline response for any organization/industry that can be utilized for natural 
disasters, as well as terrorist incidents (Asis International, 2008). 
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IV. HSAS FLAWS 
The General Accounting Office (GAO) and the Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) independently conducted studies of HSAS and determined flaws that needed to be 
addressed.  
A. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE  
The GAO issued a report on February 26, 2004 covering information obtained 
from a questionnaire sent to federal agencies along with information gathered from states 
and local governments based on their critical infrastructure. This report reviewed five 
specific areas of concern (General Accounting Office, 2004a). 
• The Advisory System includes threat analysis, notifications, and ongoing 
revisions, but protocols for notification have not been documented  
• Federal, state, and local agencies reported receiving useful information 
and guidance, but would prefer more specific information 
• Federal agencies reported enhancing existing protective measures more 
often than implementing new measures, while state and local agencies 
reported implementing additional measures 
• Cost data reported by federal, state, and local government agencies is 
limited 
• Some federal, state, and local government agencies have similar advisory 
systems, but can change threat levels independently 
A second report issued by GAO in June 2004 covered some of the same aspects 
of the previous report but examined the following specific areas (General Accounting 
Office, 2004b). 
1. The Decision-Making Process for Changing the National Threat Level 
The national threat level is assigned by the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
consultation with members of the Homeland Security Council, based on analysis of 
intelligence information and assessment of the vulnerability of potential terrorist targets. 
This same assessment is used to determine whether specific industrial sectors or 
geographic regions should operate at heightened levels (General Accounting Office, 
2004b, p. 4). 
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2. Guidance and Other Information Provided to Federal Agencies, 
States, and Localities, Including the Applicability of Risk 
Communication Principles to Information Sharing  
No documented protocol exists for providing threat information to federal 
agencies and states. The reason given by DHS officials is that it has been difficult to 
develop a protocol that provides flexibility for sharing information in a variety of 
situations. Risk communications experts suggest that to ensure comprehensive 
information dissemination, threat warnings should consist of the following: 
communication through multiple methods, timely notification, and specific threat 
information and guidance on actions to take. While DHS uses multiple methods to 
communicate threat information, many federal agencies and states responded that they 
first learned about changes from media sources rather than official channels. They also 
reported that they did not receive specific threat information or guidance, which hindered 
their ability to implement protective measures (General Accounting Office, 2004b, pp. 4–
5). 
3. Protective Measures Federal Agencies, States, and Localities 
Implemented During High-Code Orange-Alert Periods 
Some federal agencies reported that they regularly operate at high levels of 
security, and therefore, did not have to implement a substantial number of additional 
measures to respond to code-orange alerts. In contrast, states indicated that factors, such 
as specific threat information, influenced the extent to which they implemented additional 
measures. Both federal agencies and states indicated that increased protective measures 
adversely affected their operations. A specific comment was that multiple government 
agencies providing conflicting information limited the states’ ability to coordinate and 
implement measures (General Accounting Office, 2004b, p. 5). 
4. Additional Costs Federal Agencies Reported for Implementing Such 
Measures 
Cost data reported by federal agencies did not include all additional costs and may 
not have been reliable. However, despite these limitations, the data was sufficient to be 
an indicator of general trends. Some federal agencies reported no additional costs as they 
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had already implemented protective measures or redirected existing resources; however, 
they may not have accounted for indirect costs (General Accounting Office, 2004b, p. 6). 
5. Information DHS Collected on Costs States and Localities Reported 
for Periods of Code-Orange Alert 
Information collected from various state and local sources on the costs associated 
with elevating the threat level did not represent all additional costs incurred. As a result, 
the reported information may not be adequate for making generalizations regarding 
incurred costs during periods of heightened response for federal, state, and local agencies 
(General Accounting Office, 2004b, p. 7). 
B. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 
CRS was asked to review HSAS, and issued an initial report on August 6, 2003 
with several subsequent updates. The CRS report concluded that while the need for 
terrorist threat warnings seems to be widely acknowledged, numerous issues were 
associated with HSAS and its effects on states, localities, the public, and the private 
sector. Issues with HSAS as noted by CRS include the following (Reese, 2003). 
1. Vagueness of Warnings 
With each change in threat condition, intelligence information was cited but 
offered little specificity, such as region, state, or city. Moreover, DHS has never 
explained the sources and quality of intelligence upon which the threat levels were based 
(Reese, 2003, p. 4). The assertion is that when federal government officials announce a 
new warning about terrorist attacks, the threats are too vague and that the public may 
begin to question the authenticity of the HSAS threat level. The concern is that if the 
credibility of the system is questioned, the public may wonder how to act or whether to 
take any special action at all, which could eventually lead to complacency (Reese, 2003, 
p. 5). 
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2. Lack of Specific Protective Measures for State and Local 
Governments, the Public, and the Private Sector 
HSAS provides protective measures for each threat condition, but are identified 
only for federal agencies. DHS only recommends protective measures for states, 
localities, the public, or the private sector; however, the recommended protective 
measures are the same ones issued to federal agencies. HSAS silence with regard to 
protective measures for the public, the private sector, and state and local governments has 
drawn the attention of some interested observers. Citing what some contend is a lack of 
DHS guidance on protective measures; non-federal entities are beginning to fill the 
perceived void (Reese, 2003, p. 6). 
3. Communication of Terrorist Threats to State and Local 
Governments, the Public, and the Private Sector 
DHS uses a variety of communications systems to provide terrorist threat 
warnings to states, localities, the public, and the private sector, including state and major 
urban area fusion centers; also at classified levels. The public is alerted to a change in a 
HSAS threat condition through the news media, following a public announcement from 
DHS or media leak of the information. No Emergency Alert System type communication 
is activated to alert the public to a change in threat condition. Therefore, the public is not 
informed of the change until they monitor a public news source (Reese, 2003, p. 8). 
4. Coordination of HSAS with Other Warning Systems 
HSAS is not the only federal warning system to provide timely notification about 
imminent and potentially catastrophic threats to health and safety. Some argue for the 
consolidation of the existing warning systems into one “all-hazard” system. 
Consolidation and coordination of these warning systems would present challenges to 
administering an “all-hazard” warning system. Some of the challenges include the 
administration of the warning system, interoperability of existing warning systems, and 
the involvement of industry. Consolidating and coordinating federal warning systems, 
however, may cause a loss of concentration on the systems’ traditional hazards. Mature  
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warning systems have established alerting protocols and routines that, if consolidated, 
could become too broad, which may result in less effective warnings (Reese, 2003, pp. 9–
11). 
5. Cost of Threat Level Changes 
An increase in the HSAS threat level imposes both direct and indirect costs on 
federal, state, and local governments, the private sector, and the public. These costs 
include the increased security measures undertaken by states and localities, loss to 
tourism, and the indirect cost on the economy during a period of heightened threat level.  
Local governments incur direct costs when they put in place additional security 
measures to deal with a higher threat condition. Due to the budget crisis that many states 
are experiencing, additional homeland security costs during heightened threat periods are 
seen as an additional fiscal burden. An indirect cost of a heightened threat level is the 
negative effect on tourism in cities perceived as potential targets of terrorism. Some 
municipal officials have had to make a costly decision between homeland security and 
tourism (Reese, 2003, pp. 12–13). 
Authorized program expenditures are another point of contention that states and 
localities have with homeland security funding and costs. All homeland security grant 
programs list authorized equipment and activities that grant allocations can be used to 
fund. States and localities may argue that these authorized expenditures do not address 
their specific homeland security needs (Reese, 2003, p. 13). 
These direct homeland security costs occur not only at the state and local level 
when the threat level changes. Federal departments and agencies have to adopt prescribed 
protective measures outlined in the different threat condition levels of HSAS (Reese, 
2003, p. 13). 
In addition to discussing the flaws in the system, the most recent report discussed 
Congressional actions that have been proposed. The first would have required DHS to 
establish a telephone alert network to warn the public of terrorist incidents and disasters 
and would provide information on protective measures. Another proposed establishing a 
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National Alert Office within the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The 
final proposal would have required DHS to change the current system to require 
information on the threat and protective measures be included in the warnings. The 
warnings would also have been limited to a specific region, locality, or economic sector, 
and would have required issuing warnings without the use of the color designations 
(Reese, 2008). 
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V. PSYCHOLOGY OF TERRORIST WARNINGS 
While cities and government agencies faced a financial burden instituting threat 
level changes, individuals faced an entirely different aspect. The fear of living under 
continued levels of high risk of a terrorist attack placed a psychological burden on 
individuals who were not being provided with all the details regarding a threat. Initial 
responders were becoming worn down both physically and psychologically from working 
overtime. Even without conducting attacks, terrorists were gaining the upper hand and 
attaining their goals. The Center for Defense Information Terrorism Project stressed that 
HSAS was created in part to a response to criticism received each time the Homeland 
Security Office announced public warnings of terror attacks after 9/11. Four warnings 
were issued from October 2001 and February 2002 before HSAS came into existence. No 
terrorist attacks followed the warnings so it is not obvious whether the warnings helped 
prevent attacks or eroded the credibility of the warnings. Government officials and the 
public complained that the warnings urged citizens to be prepared for an attack without 
providing any specifications of time, location or type. Many questioned the utility of the 
warnings, and believed they merely propagated public fear (Center for Defense 
Information Terrorism Project, 2002). 
Rose McDermott and Philip Zimbardo in an article entitled “The Psychological 
Consequences of Terrorist Alerts” state that in reality only two real colors exist despite 
having been created with five colors. The rationale is that red actually means the nation is 
under attack and no politician is willing to lower the level below yellow for fear of an 
actual attack occurring. The authors emphasize that terror alerts produce both political 
and psychological effects. Politically, first responders and the public increase their 
vigilance. However, terror alerts can also result in negative outcomes, such as negative 
public mental health outcomes (without a commensurate increase in security), increased 
depression, and posttraumatic stress disorder. In addition, these alerts encourage 
unthinking support for charismatic leadership; and pose a threat to diverse political 
culture. Their main argument is that the current system does the terrorist’s work for them  
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by inducing anxiety, depression, and paralysis in the population, and through their 
discussion, offer suggestions for a more effective and less destructive system 
(McDermott & Zimbardo, 2007, pp. 358–359). 
The authors highlight that during the first six terrorist alerts issued following 9/11 
alleged to have reliable information from “credible” yet unnamed sources warning of an 
imminent attack somewhere, sometime soon, in the United States or elsewhere in the 
world, against it offices or agencies. The very vagueness of these warnings following on 
the heels of 9/11 created high levels of fear and anxiety for ordinary citizens. With no 
concrete actions to take other than being vigilant, citizens were further confused when 
told to “go about your business as usual.” McDermott and Zimbardo ask how it is 
possible to “go about your normal business” after being told of an increased threat of a 
terrorist attack, which ultimately leads to a feeling of helplessness. This situation was 
worsened when no additional attacks occurred, but the government also did not offer any 
explanation when the threat level was decreased. Where had the terrorist threat gone? 
After following this process during multiple alerts, the authors assert that habituation 
effects set in, and people cease to respond to the danger or take appropriate actions 
without knowing the results of previous actions taken. In effect, citizens became 
desensitized to the high alert level and found themselves trapped in the conundrum of 
being inured to report suspicious events or individuals, but too anxious to return to 
normal life (McDermott & Zimbardo, 2007, pp. 359–360). 
With the advent of the color-coded alert system, one voice indicating that the 
information came from multiple intelligence sources, a list of potential “soft” targets, and 
worst case scenario thinking as to the weapons the terrorists were likely to use, it 
appeared that the warning process had improved. Even a shopping list of actions citizens 
could take to be prepared was created. Experts provided information on security 
measures and warnings were placed on the DHS website. At the same time, the Orange 
alert level was announced and individuals were seen taking the prescribed actions. 
However, when no attack occurred again with any explanation from the government, and 
then learning that some of the intelligence may have been a hoax, credibility of the 
system suffered (McDermott & Zimbardo, 2007, pp. 360–361). 
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With the installation of fear and anxiety into civilians being accomplished by the 
government through mismanaged terrorist alerts and the spending of limited resources in 
anticipation of attacks that never occur, the terrorists’ work is being done for them. The 
authors throw out the possibility that the terrorists having seen the frenzy caused by the 
alarms and having learned lessons from the past, may be intentionally disseminating 
misinformation to keep this nation on a high level of alert, which will eventually have 
both an economic impact in the constant spending on homeland security, as well as a 
psychological impact with heightened anxiety and confusion, particularly when 
considering an attack has not occurred since 9/11. The authors allude that the alerts create 
a climate of hostility and danger that encourages political disengagement that results in 
more willingness to accept restrictions on personal freedoms to prevent terrorist activity. 
They then delve into studies that show the continued psychological toll of the 9/11 
attacks and how the effects may be exacerbated or prolonged with the continued 
heightened levels of alert maintained under HSAS (McDermott & Zimbardo, 2007, pp. 
361–363). 
The authors then draw upon two theories to help explain the possible impacts of 
the terror alert system. Under the social identity theory, the threat of terrorist attacks 
would increase group identification with consequent support for leadership along with 
hatred of foreign groups perceived to be responsible, which is enhanced by the terror 
management theory that reminds people of their own mortality that results in an increased 
need for safety and psychological security. This theory also demonstrates that people will 
be drawn to those who express a similar worldview while excluding those with different 
views (McDermott & Zimbardo, 2007, pp. 363–364). 
McDermott and Zimbardo question why the government would create and 
maintain an ineffective and psychologically damaging system. Their explanation is that 
although the system is neither ideal nor as effective as it could be, it does serve legitimate 
subsidiary political goals. They stress that while inefficient, the current system does 
provide first responders with additional funding for new equipment and training. It also 
provides a cover for elected officials in the event of another attack. An alternative 
hypothesis proposed is that leaders may manipulate public opinion using fear to gain 
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political power or advantage. Fear will motivate people to become more vigilant; 
however, high levels of fear can also prove distracting so a line must be drawn to 
maintain a balance. An attack can also generate anger, as was witnessed in the days 
following 9/11, and will make the population more supportive of government actions in 
conducting punitive actions, particularly as long as these actions are seen as producing 
positive results (McDermott & Zimbardo, 2007, pp. 364–365). 
The authors suggest two limitations to the current system. First, warnings should 
be issued by a credible source based on specific information. People should be told the 
where and when of threats, and after a period of time, should also be told whether an 
attack was preempted or if the information was flawed. However, political implications 
exist in performing this act of notification. State and local governments may have the 
desire to disseminate the information before the federal government; in addition, it can be 
argued that disseminating information on certain targets may just drive terrorists to hit 
softer targets. A credibility issue is also involved if an alert is issued, resources spent, and 
no attack occurs. The second limitation is that alerts need to be tied to actual behaviors. A 
heightened alert level should mean more than increased vigilance or the result would be 
nothing more than increased anxiety and depression. Specific and realistic actions for 
people to take to reduce the risk and protect themselves will have positive impact. 
Naming specific groups or ethnicities can produce negative impacts and should be well 
thought out before being issued as part of an alert. Alerts should also be geographic in 
scope to reduce the number of individuals in the potential “worry” zone. Alerting the 
general public is also not always required, and in some cases, only first responders should 
receive the warnings. Alerting the general public in these instances may only serve to 
increase stress without providing any additional security. The authors propose a 
reexamination of how to best construct and utilize terror alarm systems and how to 
explain negative results to the public. Repeated false alarms could eventually lead to 
complacency and a lack of preparedness to respond during an actual event. High levels of 
sustained stress can have a destructive impact on the nation that could be worse than any 
actual terrorist attack (McDermott & Zimbardo, 2007, pp. 365–367). 
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The authors conclude with a two-track policy towards threats. First, terrorist 
threats should not be used for domestic political purposes as doing so reduces effective 
responses from the population and accomplishes the terrorists’ job by placing fear into 
their intended targets without exposure on their part. Second, warnings should be 
credible, specific, timely, and designed to motivate people to take protective measures. 
When threats do not materialize, open dialogue should occur as to how the threat was 
averted. By incorporating these two measures into a reconstructed system, credibility can 
be maintained with more effectiveness, at less cost, and with less anxiety (McDermott & 
Zimbardo, 2007, p. 368). 
The psychological impact of repeated changes or lengthy periods of elevated 
alerts need to be factored in, regardless of the threat advisory system in place. Passing on 
credible information and keeping the public informed are essential in an effective 
advisory system. The general public has enough built in fear of terrorist activity and does 
not need to have that increased by false warnings or elevated threat levels far beyond 
what may actually be required. A significant portion of this process is letting the public 
know that a threat has been eliminated, not just that the threat level has been reduced. 
While fear can be used for positive purposes, it can become difficult to have people 
continue their normal routines if they are suspecting everyone is a terrorist or every 
package contains a bomb. Terrorist alerts and raising the threat levels should be 
accomplished judiciously, based on credible information, established for a specific 
timeframe, and not be politically motivated. Using specific alerts targeting geographic 
areas or industrial regions will also help to limit undue anxiety in regions not being 
targeted. 
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VI. A COMPARISON OF TWO CITIES 
The cities of San Antonio, Texas and Agency, Iowa are 1,000 miles apart, in 
separate regions of the country, entirely different in size and ethnic composition, but have 
at least two items in common. The first is that that author has lived in both, Agency for 
18 years and San Antonio for eight years. The second is that both came under the 
auspices of HSAS. 
Using two cities with such extremes may seem like stacking the deck against 
HSAS, but in reality, shows that the nature of the one size fits all approach did not in this 
event work effectively for all. It was effective as an initial product to give the country 
something to focus on and use to develop plans and allocate resources, but beyond those 
initial few months, HSAS needed an overhaul.  
Under the conditions established by HSAS, both communities have been under 
the threat of a significant risk of terrorist attack and have had to take appropriate risk 
measures. Either city could be a potential target depending on the terrorists’ goals; 
therefore, both would need to heed the recommendations provided by HSAS.  
Cities like San Antonio and Agency were left to their own devices through much 
of the duration of HSAS. Designed for the federal government, HSAS left local 
communities to determine their own specific threat level responses (Bush, 2002). 
A. SAN ANTONIO 
Known as the home of the Alamo, and famous for its Riverwalk, San Antonio, 
Texas is a rapidly growing, 16 percent in the previous 10 years, multi-cultural city 
bisected by three Interstate highways, one of which links the two coasts while another 
runs from the Mexican to the Canadian border (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011). The 2010 
census data lists San Antonio as the second largest city in Texas and seventh largest in 
the United States (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010a). With three major military installations, 
(Lackland AFB, Randolph AFB, and Ft. Sam Houston) and a large retired military 
population, San Antonio is commonly referred to as “Military City” and is annually  
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visited by more than 20 million tourists per year. With an economy driven largely by the 
tourist trade, San Antonio is also headquarters for several large corporations ranging from 
the energy structure to financial services and medical care.  
For San Antonio, the cost of overtime for additional shifts for fire and police 
during periods of increased alerts would eventually put a significant dent in the city’s 
budget, not taking into account the additional strain it would put on the limited manpower 
available. Then, add in lost revenues from tourists who are staying away, and the 
situation is compounded. Eventually, the terrorist wins by keeping San Antonio in a 
higher level of alert than required, which was a flaw of HSAS in that limited flexibility 
was provided without going against recommended advice when a threat warning was 
issued. The reports issued by GAO not only focused on the cost factors associated with 
HSAS but also the decision-making process and the manner in which the threat 
information was transmitted to the country (General Accounting Office, 2004a; General 
Accounting Office, 2004b). 
San Antonio was kept under an elevated threat for years despite knowing the true 
nature or potential targets of the threat. As highlighted by McDermott and Zimbardo, 
individuals remained confused and created higher levels of fear and anxiety (McDermott 
& Zimbardo, 2007, pp. 359–360). In time, individuals became frustrated with the system, 
as no tangible evidence was presented of when an attack was prevented or where it had 
been aimed. The Mayor of San Antonio, just as every other large city mayor, had a vested 
interest to keep the threat level reduced  to minimize costs and keep the flow of tourist 
trade and dollars. 
A Homeland Security Brief from August 2003 reflected how states were 
struggling to define protective measures and how the costs of additional security at the 
higher levels were beginning to have an impact on the economy. The first chapter 
provides a description of the confusion caused when multiple threat levels are 
encountered within the confines of a city. Basically, HSAS had reached a point at which 
the public had become complacent about the advisory system and were doing nothing 
when increased levels were announced.  
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B. AGENCY 
On the other extreme, Agency, built on the site of an Indian agency for the Sac 
and Fox tribe, is located in rich Iowa farmland, has a total population including rural 
areas of slightly more than 1,100 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010b), is now bypassed by the 
nearest highway, and has no major industry other than farming. 
A major factor that comes into play is the cost of implementing and maintaining 
the additional security measures as the threat level is increased. In a town the size of 
Agency with no police force and a volunteer fire department, the costs and long-range 
impacts are minimal. Yet, with a smaller tax base, the burden of any associated costs is 
greater on the individuals in a smaller community. A series of reports issued by CRS 
(Reese, 2003) focused on the cost of threat-level changes, but went deeper into the effects 
HSAS had on local communities regarding the vague warnings with no specific 
recommendations provided. 
Agency was kept under an elevated threat for years despite knowing the true 
nature or potential targets of the threat. This situation was of minor impact in a city the 
size of Agency with no industry and not being a transportation hub. However, the lack of 
confidence and misunderstanding of HSAS was evident in Agency, as much as anywhere 
else. On visits home, friends and relatives would approach the author, ask what a specific 
threat meant, what they were suppose to do if it increased, and did it really apply to them. 
All they wanted to do was go about their normal daily routines without fear of a constant 
terrorist threat being broadcast before them in a system they no longer trusted or 
understood.  
While developing a system that would fit every city equally would be near 
impossible, an effective advisory system would have flexibility to account for differences 
in population, geography, and transportation. The system should not instill fear or anxiety 
into the population, nor overtax the local economy while providing an effective shield 
against terrorist activity. HSAS was not the right fit as it provided little flexibility for 
cities to adjust. In addition, with NTAS being untested, no current method of knowing  
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how it would fit two such diverse locations exists. What is known is that by considering 
military installations as cities unto themselves, the DoD FPCON system does provide the 
type of flexible response sought. 
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VII. NATIONAL TERRORISM ADVISORY SYSTEM (NTAS) 
On July 14, 2009, Secretary Napolitano established the Homeland Security 
Advisory System Task Force to conduct a 60-day review of HSAS. Its mission was to 
assess effectiveness of the system in informing the public about terrorist threats and 
communicating protective measures within government and the private sector. The Task 
Force was co-chaired by Fran Townsend, former Assistant to President George W. Bush 
for Homeland Security, and Judge William Webster, former director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation and Central Intelligence Agency (Homeland Security, 2009a). In 
establishing this task force, Secretary Napolitano stated, “My goal is simple: to have the 
most effective system in place to inform the American people about threats to our 
country” (Homeland Security, 2009b). 
In September 2009, the task force published its report and recommendation that 
included six major themes in the Executive Summary (Homeland Security Advisory 
Council, 2009a). 
A. ENDURING MERIT OF A DEDICATED TERRORISM ADVISORY 
SYSTEM 
The Task Force viewed a requirement for a threat warning system and that the 
system should be dedicated to terrorism. It found that significant work was warranted 
concerning providing useful and credible information to the general public along with 
improvements to government and the private sector. With the loss of public confidence, 
the Task Force recommended specific measures that should be taken including reducing 
the number of threat levels and that the system should be automatically lowered back to a 
baseline unless credible intelligence indicated remaining at a higher alert. Specific 
protocols were also recommended for the decision-making and communication process of 
changing a threat level (Homeland Security Advisory Council, 2009a). 
B. TWO AUDIENCES—THE PUBLIC AND “INSTITUTIONS” 
The Task Force agreed HSAS had two primary audiences. The first, consisting of 
the federal government, state and local governments, and the private sector, have used 
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HSAS for planning and has functioned reasonably well for this audience; however, 
improvements are needed. In regards to the second audience, the general public, the Task 
Force found that communication of useful information in a credible manner was poor and 
that significant work was warranted (Homeland Security Advisory Council, 2009a). 
C. THE CURRENT ADVISORY SYSTEM—COMMANDING 
INSUFFICIENT PUBLIC CONFIDENCE 
The Task Force agreed that, at best, indifference was directed at HSAS, with, at 
worst, a disturbing lack of public confidence in the system. The Task Force determined 
this situation must be remedied and outlined constructive measures divided into two 
topics, The Question of Colors and Measures to Restore Public Confidence (Homeland 
Security Advisory Council, 2009a). 
As to maintaining a color-coded system, the Task Force was divided with half the 
membership believing the color-coded alerts were sufficiently clear, powerful, and easily 
understood and should be retained. The other half of the membership believed the color-
coded system suffered from a lack of credibility and clarity leading to the erosion of 
public confidence and should be abandoned. All agreed that if retained, substantial 
reform was required (Homeland Security Advisory Council, 2009a). 
To restore confidence in the system, the Task Force recommended the following 
measures to the Secretary (Homeland Security Advisory Council, 2009a). 
• A discipline of more narrowly targeting the specific region and sector 
under threat, avoiding elevating the alert status of the nation as a whole. 
• A practice of providing more specific information on new threats: 
including information on the type of threat, the credibility of the source of 
the information, and the steps the government is taking to mitigate the 
vulnerability. 
• A practice of accompanying new alerts with actionable steps the public 
can take. 
• An acknowledgement that the new baseline for the United States is 
guarded. This country remains a nation confronting the threat of terrorist 
attack, but given that it remains ever on guard, the number of levels can be 
reduced from five to three. 
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• As disciplined a focus on lowering the alert status as now goes into raising 
it. 
• A practice of debriefing the nation after alerts have been issued—what 
happened to the threat, is it possible to now return to “guarded” status? 
D. CHANGING THE ALERT LEVEL BASELINE TO GUARDED STATUS 
In the judgment of the Task Force, a central feature of HSAS was that the threat 
level moved up more easily than it moved down. The Task Force stated a bias should 
exist against keeping the nation, region, or sector at an elevated alert in the absence of 
specific, ongoing threat information. They recommended the Secretary consider a 
“forcing mechanism” to return the level to “guarded” and that the alert level should be 
automatically lowered within 15 days unless credible intelligence indicated otherwise 
(Homeland Security Advisory Council, 2009a). 
E. GREATER PRECISION IS REQUIRED IN IDENTIFYING THE 
SPECIFIC LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, FIRST RESPONDERS AND 
PRIVATE-SECTOR COMPANIES THREATENED AND THE 
PROTECTIVE MEASURES THAT NECESSITATE A RESPONSE 
The Task Force recognized the significant success HSAS has had in the detailed 
planning of protective measures to be taken based on increased threats. It acknowledged 
the extensive planning and communication between thousands of agencies in developing 
response plans and recognized the role HSAS, as an instrument of national planning, 
contributed to this nation’s enhanced state of readiness. However, the Task Force 
believed the cost in dollars of overly broad alerts is a substantial problem and 
recommended the following responses (Homeland Security Advisory Council, 2009a). 
• Targeted raising of the formal alert status—as opposed to issuance of 
broad based verbal warnings. 
• To the extent possible, the American people should be provided as much 
threat detail consistent with national security—with a focus on specific 
location and sector at actual risk. 
• The alert system must return any elevated status to “guarded” as soon as 
possible, consistent with the threat intelligence, unless credible 
intelligence shows a need to maintain an elevated alert. 
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F. THE HOMELAND SECURITY ALERT SYSTEM WILL REQUIRE 
DEDICATED INFRASTRUCTURE, STAFF, ESTABLISHED 
PROTOCOLS AND PROCEDURES 
HSAS was created during a crisis with admirable speed in the aftermath of 9/11. 
As a result, executive branch leaders responded to a rapid succession of threats using ad 
hoc practices for changing the nation’s alert status and communicating the message. The 
system also had no staff dedicated to manage the work. The Task Force recommended 
the Secretary establish protocols, procedures, and staff with a basic infrastructure 
including the following (Homeland Security Advisory Council, 2009a). 
• Criteria for deciding when an alert shall be made or a change in threat 
status announced 
• A protocol for applying the criteria to new threat information 
• A protocol for consultation with the White House 
• A protocol for communicating alerts and new status information 
• A protocol for providing the supporting information to the public at the 
time of the alerts 
• Individuals designated to coordinate the resulting communications 
In their report, the Task Force included a summary of 141 public comments 
concerning alteration of HSAS. Of these comments, 82 percent were in favor of replacing 
or altering HSAS, with a significant number in favor of scrapping the system altogether, 
while 16.5 percent recommended moving from colors to numbers, 11 percent favored 
scrapping the system and replacing it with words/alerts, while 5 percent favored changing 
to a stoplight-based color system. Only 18 percent offered support for HSAS (Homeland 
Security Advisory Council, 2009a). 
Of those favoring change, the most common critique was based on colors, while 
many felt that HSAS used fear tactics and the system laced credibility due to its 
ambiguity. Concern of political manipulation and the need to infuse more specific 
information were voiced by most respondents. Reducing to three colors or incorporating 
a numerical scale with associated wording were also popular comments. Many felt the 
system lost its credibility when the whole nation was alerted while the threat was regional 
in nature. Of those expressing a desire to retain HSAS, the most common argument was 
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the amount of planning and measures already developed to align with the system would 
be wasted if a new system were implemented (Homeland Security Advisory Council, 
2009a). 
Based on the recommendations of the Task Force, Secretary Napolitano 
announced implementation of NTAS on April 20, 2011, by stating, “The terrorist threat 
facing our country has evolved significantly over the past ten years, and in today’s 
environment….we know that the best security strategy is one that counts on the American 
public as a key partner in securing our country.” She continued to state, “NTAS will 
provide the American public with information about credible threats” (Homeland 
Security, 2011d). Secretary Napolitano stated, “The old warnings using the color-coded 
system and indicating levels ranging from low to severe were too vague, the colors were 
there, but there was no information backing them up.” She further stated, “the normal 
status for the country is high risk” (Fox News, 2011). It is interesting to note this 
statement, which in effect meant the conditions this nation had been living under were 
now the new baseline.  
NTAS alerts will only be issued when credible information is available and will 
provide a concise summary of the potential threat, information about actions being taken 
to ensure public safety, and recommended steps that individuals, communities, 
businesses, and governments can take to help prevent, mitigate, or respond to the threat. 
Alerts will be based on the nature of the threat and are defined as the following 
(Homeland Security, 2011c). 
• Elevated Threat—Warns of a credible terrorist threat against the United 
States 
• Imminent Threat—Warns of a credible, specific, and impending terrorist 
threat against the United States 
Dependent on the nature of the threat, alerts may be sent to law enforcement, 
distributed to affected areas of the private sector, or issued broadly to the public through 
official and social media channels, including the DHS webpage, Facebook, and Twitter 
(Homeland Security, 2011d). 
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An additional aspect of NTAS is the inclusion of a sunset provision indicating a 
specific time period when the alert will automatically expire unless new information 
becomes available warranting extension or if the threat itself evolves (Homeland 
Security, 2011d). 
In her implementation remarks, Secretary Napolitano noted no current threats 
would reach the level to warrant one of the new alerts. Other remarks concerning NTAS 
were delivered by Representative Peter King of New York who “praised the new system 
as an upgrade that enhances current security efforts;” however, Senator Susan Collins of 
Maine cautioned that the new system must “effectively disseminate threat information in 
a timely manner and provide sound guidance to the public and affected homeland 
security partners on the actions they should take to protect themselves and the nation” 
(CNN Travel, 2011). 
Representative Bennie Thompson of Mississippi issued a statement following the 
unveiling of NTAS, “Today marks an end to the era of color-coded scare 
tactics….because it failed to provide specific, actionable information….led to charges of 
manipulation to sow fear and gain political advantage and that the system being launched 
today promises credible information that members of the public can use to prepare, 
protect and respond” (Yahoo News, 2011a). 
Despite lofty goals and the promise of how NTAS would restore credibility that 
had been lost under HSAS by providing information to the public regarding credible 
threats, in reality, a non-transparent system was created that has yet to issue an alert. 
NTAS not only replaced the color-coded HSAS, but it has also become invisible. The 
media has not asked any questions or opened discussions regarding NTAS, even during 
events that would seemingly call for an alert to be issued. While no metrics are available 
to determine the effectiveness of NTAS, it would be safe to say it has not performed as 
described since no alerts have been issued. The general public has little information about 
NTAS and has not had confidence restored in threat advisories since it has not been used. 
Restoring credibility has to be done by showing how the system works and providing 
credible threat information, not by placing it on a shelf and never using it. 
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VIII. OPTIONS 
HSAS is broken, has lost credibility with the public, and with identified flaws, 
needs a revision or replacement advisory system to alert the public in a timely manner 
with credible information on terrorist activities. Critics of HSAS have charged the system 
is being used for political purposes and is failing to tell the public the whole story. Flaws 
identified in the beginning had yet to be addressed. The Task Force established to review 
HSAS came to similar conclusions and made several recommendations on repairing or 
replacing the system while remaining split on many issues. Secretary Napolitano chose to 
replace HSAS with NTAS as the best method to restore credibility.  
Based on the author’s research and understanding of HSAS, he reached similar 
options as the Task Force but with a different recommendation.  
A. LEAVING HSAS IN PLACE 
Keeping HSAS in place is no longer a viable option. Put into place in the 
aftermath of terrorist attacks, HSAS served its designed purpose, but quickly became 
overrun with criticism regarding the lack of information and political use. Usage of the 
system began to lapse as credibility faltered. With outlined flaws from GAO and CRS, 
along with the overall negative opinion of HSAS, keeping the system in place would be a 
difficult task. A complete revision of HSAS and its processes would be required to 
restore integrity and trust. 
Research was conducted to see if HSAS could be improved by implementing 
processes from comparable international systems; however, after reviewing the few 
systems in place, it was determined they had similar flaws or would be even more 
difficult for individuals to understand than HSAS.  
In reviewing state homeland security websites to see how information was being 
posted, or how security procedures were being recommended for the varying threat 




level, other than a link to the DHS website. The trend in several states was towards an all 
hazards approach in developing preparedness and response plans that lumped terrorism in 
with natural disasters, which HSAS had not been designed to achieve.  
When Secretary Napolitano established the Homeland Security Advisory System 
Task Force to conduct a review of HSAS, the picture began to clear. The findings of the 
Task Force indicated major changes were required to establish a system that would be 
effective and found trustworthy.  
B. REPLACING HSAS WITH THE NATIONAL TERRORISM ADVISORY 
SYSTEM (CURRENTLY IMPLEMENTED) 
NTAS is currently the alert system in place. Its intended purpose is to keep the 
U.S. populace informed of credible terrorist threats. Secretary Napolitano announced 
implementation of the NTAS on April 20, 2011 based on recommendations from the 
Task Force. The color-coded system and vague information were now gone and replaced 
by terrorist alerts. Despite the country being placed at “High Risk,” it was noted no 
current threats existed that would reach the level to warrant one of the new alerts. NTAS 
alerts will only be issued when credible information is available and will provide a 
concise summary of the threat along with information about actions to be taken to help 
prevent, mitigate, or respond to the threat.  
Almost two years have passed, and no NTAS alerts have been issued regarding 
terrorist threats. Terrorist activity, or the threat of such activity, has occurred during this 
time frame. Either the information was not deemed credible, did not reach the level 
required to issue an alert, or was not issued for political reasons. It is unfortunate that the 
system put into place to restore credibility and public confidence has not been used to do 
just that. It is almost as if the new system itself has become non-existent. NTAS has 
never been practiced nor has the media discussed it, and the author ventures the majority 
of the public knows little or nothing about the alerts. If this system is going to be 
retained, it needs to be utilized so that the public is made aware of what to expect and 
how to respond.  
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C. MERGING HSAS WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FPCON 
A third option would be to merge HSAS with DoD FPCON. While not 
complementary to each other, the two systems have the same functions and are closely 
enough related that a merger of the two would provide a revised system with credibility 
and ease of understanding. The color-coding could be brought along and associated with 
the FPCON levels.  
While the process would be fraught with concern over military control and 
allegations of further government intrusion, merging HSAS with DoD FPCON would 
provide an easily recognized system that a large portion of the population (having served, 
worked, or lived on military installations) would understand. As previously shown in 
Figures 6 and 7, HSAS vs. FPCON Levels, the FPCON system aligns with HSAS in 
regards to threat level definitions although not specifically designed to complement.  
The process for instituting a change in threat level would not be any different and 
the system could be used locally for regional threats or nationally. The duration of the 
threat alerts would be minimized as the FPCON system was not designed to be 
maintained at high alert levels for long periods of time. An advantage of the FPCON 
system is that it already possesses pre-designed measures to be taken to improve security 
that could easily be adapted for use by other federal agencies. 
Military installations also prominently post FPCON at the gates and on buildings 
to remind personnel of the threat nature, a practice in which the public no longer engages 
as the aspect of terrorism is being removed from view; hence, the lack of alerts under 
NTAS. Other countries are not shy about posting information on terrorist threats and 
make it accessible on unclassified websites. While it is possible to access the DHS 
website and find information about NTAS, references to terrorist activity are not to be 
found. 
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When this thesis was begun, the argument was that HSAS needed to be repaired 
or replaced with an alternative system. HSAS was implemented six months after the 
attacks of 9/11. The system was coordinated and thought out before implementation. 
However, with the urgency to implement a system, basic flaws were subsequently 
identified in GAO and CRS reports discussed in this thesis. In addition to the government 
reports, many critics of the system broached concerns of political manipulation and scare 
tactics by raising alerts without providing appropriate information to the public. With the 
decline of public acceptance of HSAS, leaving the system in place as is was not a viable 
option, although except for airports, it was almost out of the public conscience after the 
last revision in August 2006 and may have eventually faded away on its own.  
HSAS served its purpose and brought this nation through the immediate response 
to 9/11, but the financial and psychological costs of maintaining a constant high alert 
were rapidly draining available resources. Whatever was done to revise the system 
needed to ensure the threat system maintained credibility, relied on credible intelligence, 
had actionable measures to take, and was easily understood by the general population. 
Whether it remained focused as a system primarily for federal agencies, or revised with 
state and local governments along with private industry, is a question that must be raised 
particularly with state and local governments, as well as industry developing their own 
measures or ignoring terrorist activity in their public response plans. Consideration of 
where HSAS failed in providing information to the public needs to be improved with 
technology and supplying the public with responses to questions when the system was 
used. The information on HSAS supports the fact that revisions were required to maintain 
credibility of the terror alert system.  
However, as often happens when projects begin, circumstances can change the 
landscape and new factors are brought into play that impact the decision process. In this 
case, the delay in completing this thesis allowed time for DHS to establish a task force, 
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review HSAS, and make recommendations on how to improve the system. The ultimate 
result was the implementation of NTAS to replace HSAS. The Task Force’s work and 
subsequent development of NTAS sustained the argument that HSAS was flawed and 
required changes. NTAS remains untested and needs more time to see how it functions 
during crises and for potential critics to review the decisions made when altering the 
threat level. 
Now that NTAS is being used, not surprisingly, very little seems to have changed, 
other than NTAS is not in the spotlight of the media or comedians as HSAS tended to be. 
The military installations in San Antonio are currently at FPCON Alpha, which is still a 
step below the wording of NTAS. Individuals are still taking the same precautionary 
measures they had become accustomed to under HSAS. At least that is how it appears. 
Upon closer examination, the measures had become so ingrained that the mere changing 
of words and elimination of a color had not changed processes, but had placed the public 
in a different level. Following implementation of NTAS, it was naturally taken for 
granted the country was operating under the old Yellow (Elevated Alert) and maintained 
the routines that had been established. However, if that were true, what happened to the 
Orange Level (High Alert) that had been in place at the airports? During the switch from 
HSAS to NTAS, no discussion of a change in the threat level occurred, just that the 
announcements and color codes were missing in the terminals. 
Look back at the statement made by Secretary Napolitano when she stated, “the 
normal status for the country is high risk” (Fox News, 2011). It was subtle, but it did 
appear in the wording, “high risk,” which under HSAS, was equivalent to Orange, and 
was now classified as the normal daily status while “elevated,” the next step in alerts 
under NTAS, had been the normal status for years under HSAS. It was a subtle change; 
the colors were eliminated, the wording changed, and the same security measures kept in 
place.  
The anniversary of 9/11 came around with the expectation of seeing multiple 
alerts issued under NTAS. No alert was issued to the news media or through the social 
network sites, Twitter and Facebook, although credible threats were being reported and 
the DoD FPCON was elevated to Bravo. If reports were flowing from fusion centers 
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through law enforcement channels and appropriate measures were taken against terrorist 
activity, the general public was not informed. This situation is of significant concern as 
NTAS was designed to provide transparency, and was touted as more open in providing 
information to the public than its predecessor. NTAS may in fact be utilized as a terrorist 
threat advisory alert even less than HSAS. 
It appears as if the problem-plagued color-coded HSAS was replaced with an 
invisible NTAS that for all intent and purposes could probably disappear without the 
general public even noticing. Maybe the intent was to have an unseen system, but with 
less information disseminated on NTAS than under HSAS. The concern to the general 
public will be the ability to understand an increased level if one is ever announced. With 
no usage to support or critique NTAS, its effectiveness is difficult to evaluate. While 
NTAS has quieted public concern about threat levels, it also has not fully lived up to its 
expectations of sharing information on threat activity.  
Although not directly linked to DoD FPCON, a close enough relationship exists 
with HSAS that they could be linked to provide a true nationwide terrorist alert system. 
The FPCON level and terrorist threat, based on the same intelligence and removed from 
the political arena, should tell the same story to the general public, as well as government 
agencies. Regardless of the system that will be used in the future, it should be designed 
and implemented to not be done in a manner that would compromise security or response 
to a terrorist attack. The UK Threat Level System is a good example to follow. After the 
London subway bombings, MI-5 made its system accessible to the public at an 
unclassified level. Not only does it address the threat level, it also discusses in detail the 
source and form of the threat, both internationally and domestically. The United States 
seem to have gone the other way in the last few years and made this nation’s system less 
public friendly. 
B. RECOMMENDATION 
A merger of HSAS with DoD FPCON would repair the lost credibility and 
revitalize the terrorist threat alert process. The two systems are similar in nature, although 
HSAS was not designed to complement the FPCON system. The easy color-coding 
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recognition of HSAS combined with the threat levels and established measures in the 
FPCON system are a match that should be implemented to provide federal agencies, the 
industrial sector, and the general public with the best threat advisory system.  
A new Task Force, similar to the one that studied HSAS, should be formed to 
review the effectiveness of NTAS, and ascertain why, after two years, no alerts have been 
issued. As part of this study, it should determine the requirement for a terrorist advisory 
system and the public’s desire to be provided with information. Again, the UK system 
would be a good example to follow on how information is displayed and presented for 
the public.  
As the struggle against terrorism continues, U.S. advisory systems need to adapt, 
be credible, and flexible enough to meet all situations, which DoD FPCON has done over 
time, and should be adopted across all federal agencies as a common threat advisory 
system and run jointly by DHS and USNORTHCOM. The industrial sector should be 
encouraged to adopt similar measures along with state homeland security offices, from 
where it would trickle down to the public. Eventually, the result will be one common 
easily understood alert system that will restore public confidence. 
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